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MULTINATIONAL FIRMS AND TAX HAVENS
Anna Gumpert, James R. Hines Jr., and Monika Schnitzer*
Abstract—Multinational firms with operations in high-tax countries can
benefit the most from reallocating taxable income to tax havens, though
this is sufficiently difficult and costly that only 20.4% of German multina-
tional firms have any tax haven affiliates. Among German manufacturing
firms, a 1 percentage point higher foreign tax rate is associated with a 2.3%
greater likelihood of owning a tax haven affiliate. This is consistent with tax
avoidance incentives and contrasts with earlier evidence for U.S. firms. The
relationship is less strong for firms in service industries, possibly reflecting
the difficulty of reallocating taxable service income.
I. Introduction
TAX havens are typically small, well-governed statesthat impose low or zero tax rates on foreign investors
(Dharmapala & Hines, 2009). Sophisticated tax avoidance
strategies involving tax havens have received considerable
attention in the media (Drucker, 2010; “Wake Up and Smell
the Coffee,” 2012; Lucas, Jopson, & Houlder, 2012), and
tax havens have repeatedly been the focus of national and
international policy measures. To name a few examples, the
OECD launched its Harmful Tax Competition project in
1996 to pressure tax havens to abolish harmful tax provi-
sions and practices. France announced plans to introduce a
50% tax on income earned by French affiliates in tax havens
in February 2010. The U.S. House Committee on Ways and
Means held a background hearing on the transfer pricing
practices of U.S. taxpayers, with an emphasis on income
reallocation to offshore tax havens. The United Kingdom
Parliament Committee of Public Accounts held widely pub-
licized hearings in 2012 concerning the use of tax havens by
foreign multinational firms operating in Britain. Partly as a
consequence, the G-20 finance ministers in their February
2013 meeting pledged to take collective action to develop
measures to address tax base erosion and profit shifting,
tasking the OECD with recommending policies that could be
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enacted by national governments, which resulted in OECD
recommendations to the G20 finance ministers in October
2015.
What drives the policy interest is the concern that tax
havens are widely used to avoid tax obligations, particularly
those due to high-tax countries. This concern is consis-
tent with at least some of the evidence: the U.S. Congress
Joint Committee on Taxation (2010) report identifies spe-
cific methods by which U.S. firms use transactions with tax
haven affiliates to avoid tax obligations, and Desai, Foley,
and Hines (2006) offer evidence that ownership of a regional
tax haven affiliate is associated with reduced foreign tax
payments. It is clear, however, that corporations cannot use
tax haven operations to avoid all taxes easily and compre-
hensively, as reflected in persistent significant corporate tax
collections by high-tax countries. Furthermore, Desai et al.
(2006) offers evidence that in 1999, just 59% of U.S. multi-
nationals with significant foreign operations had any tax
haven affiliates. This suggests that substantial tax avoid-
ance opportunities through the use of tax haven operations
are selectively available only to certain firms, industries, or
activities, though the available evidence describes only U.S.
firms.
The purpose of this paper is to identify factors associ-
ated with demand by German multinational firms for tax
haven operations. German firms are major foreign investors,
so their use of tax havens to avoid taxes is potentially quite
important; furthermore, evidence of their tax haven use is
a valuable complement to existing studies of the behavior
of U.S. firms. The data indicate that among manufacturing
firms, those that are larger and more productive are the most
likely to have tax haven affiliates. Notably, manufacturing
firms whose nonhaven foreign operations are located in high-
tax countries are more likely than others to have tax haven
affiliates. These patterns are consistent with a simple model
of profit reallocation, in which some firms find that the bene-
fits of being able to reallocate taxable income from high-tax
jurisdictions exceeds the cost of establishing tax haven affil-
iates, whereas other multinational firms, with fewer profits
to reallocate or fewer taxes to save, do not. Among firms
in service industries, tax haven use is less closely associated
with high foreign tax rates, quite possibly reflecting the more
limited scope for taxable income reallocation among firms
in service industries.
It is noteworthy that relatively few German firms use tax
havens. In the sample of all German multinational firms from
2002 to 2008, only 20.4% have tax haven affiliates. This is
considerably smaller than the fraction of U.S. firms using
tax havens and is smaller still when the sample is limited
to German manufacturing firms. This pattern implies that
cost-effective tax avoidance opportunities through the use
of tax havens may be quite limited for German firms and
The Review of Economics and Statistics, October 2016, 98(4): 713–727
© 2016 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
doi:10.1162/REST_a_00591
714 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
that the U.S. evidence of more widespread, though nonethe-
less still limited, tax haven use may be atypical on the high
side. It is particularly striking that German firms would be
less likely to use tax havens than are U.S. firms, given that
the U.S. worldwide tax system does more than does the
German territorial tax system to limit the benefits of real-
locating taxable income from high-tax countries to low-tax
countries. Many firms could benefit from reallocating tax-
able income to affiliates located in nonhaven countries that
have moderately low tax rates, though the most aggressive
and successful tax avoidance is commonly thought to involve
tax havens. As a result, this study focuses on tax haven
operations.
Much of the available evidence on the determinants of tax
haven use by multinational firms comes from studies of U.S.
firms, whose tax treatment differs from those of firms based
in almost any other major capital-exporting country. Income
earned by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms is subject to U.S.
taxation when repatriated, at which time U.S. taxpayers can
claim credits for income taxes paid to foreign governments.
This system reduces the incentive to use tax haven oper-
ations to avoid foreign taxes, since foreign tax reductions
entail fewer foreign tax credits, and therefore greater U.S.
tax liability, when income is ultimately repatriated. The sys-
tem does, however, encourage the use of tax havens to the
extent that they facilitate deferral of home country taxes,
such as by serving as coordination centers to direct foreign
profits to new foreign investments.
Germany taxes only 5% of the active foreign business
profits of its resident corporations. In this respect, the Ger-
man tax system is similar to those in the United Kingdom,
Japan, France, Canada, Italy, and most OECD countries,
particularly the major capital exporters. German firms con-
sequently have strong incentives to avoid foreign taxes, since
foreign tax savings do not entail greater home country taxes
when income is repatriated. Furthermore, German firms do
not have incentives to structure their foreign operations
in ways that avoid repatriating income. Therefore, the tax
incentives for German firms to establish tax haven affiliates
are likely to differ from those of U.S. firms and bear strong
similarities to those of other G-7 and OECD firms. To gauge
the impact of foreign taxation on tax haven investment by
German firms, the paper estimates a linear probability model
of tax haven investment using the sizes of a firm’s foreign and
domestic activities, and the firm’s R&D intensity, as addi-
tional control variables. The empirical strategy uses the panel
nature of the data to account for the fact that the tax rates a
firm faces at its foreign locations may be endogenous to its
decision to invest in a tax haven: specifically, the estimation
relies on statutory foreign tax changes subsequent to a base
year. The estimates indicate that a 1 percentage point higher
foreign tax rate is associated with a 2.3% greater likelihood
of having a tax haven affiliate, presumably reflecting the
greater benefit of reallocating taxable income from high-tax
countries.
This paper is related to two strands of the literature: one
on the use of tax havens by multinational firms and the other
on profit reallocation. Harris et al. (1993) analyze a five-
year panel of 200 large U.S. manufacturing firms and find
that U.S. tax liabilities of U.S. firms holding affiliates in Ire-
land or one of the four low-tax “dragon” Asian countries are
systematically lower than those of U.S. firms without such
activities. Hines and Rice (1994) analyze a cross-section
of country-level data on the activities of U.S. multinational
firms, finding that U.S. multinationals report disproportion-
ate shares of profits in tax havens, which suggests that
income may be reallocated for tax purposes. Grubert and
Slemrod (1998) use a cross-section of data and estimate a
joint model of the investment and profit-shifting decision of
U.S. multinationals in Puerto Rico, which, due to its special
status, can serve as a tax haven for U.S. firms. They find that
firms with intangible assets are more likely than others to
invest in Puerto Rico.
Desai et al. (2006), who are closest to our analysis, use an
affiliate-level data set on U.S. multinationals’ foreign activ-
ities in four years between 1982 and 1999. They estimate a
logit model of tax haven investment given parent character-
istics and take into account the endogeneity of the foreign
nonhaven tax rate due to simultaneity of a parent’s location
decisions. They find a negative effect of the average foreign
nonhaven tax rate on the probability of investing in a tax
haven, interpreting their finding as evidence of the impact
of incentives induced by the ability to defer home country
taxation of unrepatriated foreign profits. Thus, it is particu-
larly interesting to compare the U.S. evidence with the tax
haven investment behavior of firms that are subject to a tax
exemption regime, as German firms are, which have clear
incentives to use tax haven operations to reallocate taxable
income.
There is a vast literature on international profit shifting, so
for brevity, it is helpful to review just recent examples of dif-
ferent strands of the literature. That taxes influence reported
profits has been documented by Huizinga and Laeven (2008),
among others. They use a cross-section of European multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs) and find evidence for substantial
profit shifting between different countries in Europe, which
fits international profit-shifting incentives that arise from tax
differences between the parent and host country and among
different affiliate locations. Weichenrieder (2009) analyzes
a panel data set of German inbound and outbound FDI and
identifies empirical patterns that are consistent with profit
shifting in both cases.
With respect to different profit-shifting strategies, Claus-
ing (2001, 2003, 2006) provides empirical evidence that
taxes exert a substantial impact on transfer prices and
intrafirm trade flows of U.S. firms, while Vicard (2014) pro-
vides complementary evidence for French firms. Dischinger
and Riedel (2011) offer evidence from a panel data set
of European firms that MNEs prefer locating intangible
assets in low-tax locations, arguably doing so because they
are able to choose favorable transfer prices for intangible
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assets. Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) report similar findings
with respect to patent location within MNEs. Egger et al.
(2010) compare the debt-to-asset ratios of domestically and
foreign-owned European firms and identify a gap in the ratios
systematically related to corporate tax rates. Buettner et al.
(2009) provide further evidence on tax-motivated choice of
capital structure using a panel data set of German MNEs.
Using the same data, Buettner and Wamser (2013) ana-
lyze the use of intrafirm loans for profit shifting, but find
that they have rather small tax revenue effects. Weichen-
rieder and Mintz (2010), as well as Wamser (2011), show,
using data on German MNEs, that firms tactically locate
their direct and indirect affiliates and strategically use own-
ership chains in a way that facilitates tax avoidance. Many
of these studies, as well as others (e.g., Desai et al., 2009)
analyzing the behavior of multinational firms, confine their
analysis to manufacturing firms. This is done both due to the
importance of manufacturing and in an effort to control for
firm heterogeneity. As a result, differences in profit-shifting
opportunities between firms in different industries have been
much less extensively studied.
II. Incentives to Establish Tax Haven Operations
In this section we lay out a stylized theoretical framework
to describe the incentives of a multinational firm to invest
in a tax haven and derive the main empirical prediction we
test.
Consider a multinational firm that can invest in a range
of countries i = 0, . . . , n, including a tax haven, which is
denoted as country 0. Starting a foreign affiliate involves
fixed setup cost ci. Let ρi denote before-tax profits earned in
country i by the affiliate once it is installed. Reported profits
are taxed at rate τi in country i. Without loss of generality,
we assume that τ0 = 0; that is, there is no taxation in the tax
haven.
Firms can reallocate an amountψi of their actual profits in
country i to a country that taxes reported profits at a lower tax
rate, most notably to the tax haven country—for example, by
adjusting their transfer prices. This is possible only at some
cost. Firms may need to set up additional facilities to make
transfer prices seem plausible, inefficient relocation of pro-
duction and intrafirm trade may be needed to arrange income
reallocation, and transaction costs, like legal expenses, are
incurred. We assume that income reallocation gets increas-
ingly expensive as the amount reallocated increases relative
to income earned in country i. Following Hines and Rice
(1994), these income reallocation costs are assumed to be
(a/2)(ψi2/ρi).1 Parameter a captures how much the cost of
income reallocation increases with the amount reallocated.
Note that a is a firm-specific parameter because income
reallocation costs may vary with firm-specific characteristics
such as ownership of intangible assets. In the following, we
1 For simplicity, we assume that the costs of reallocating income to a tax
haven and another nonhaven country are equal. This assumption does not
affect the main intuition of the model but renders notation far more tractable.
assume that the income reallocation cost are incurred in the
country from which income is shifted, though the model’s
implications are quite similar if these costs are incurred in
the country to which the income is transferred.2 The reported
profit in country i, πi, after fixed cost ci is sunk, is thus
πi = ρi −ψi − a2
ψi
2
ρi
. (1)
Consider now the option of setting up an affiliate in a tax
haven at cost c0. To save on notation, we set ρ0 = 0 and
let c0 capture the net cost of investing in a tax haven, after
deducting any profits that arise genuinely in this country.
Note that due to antideferral regulations, firms may have to
incur considerable fixed costs to set up a tax haven affili-
ate that may be used for profit reallocation purposes.3 For
c0 < 0, the multinational has an interest in investing in a tax
haven country and does so, independent of investments in
other countries. This interest could arise from plans to real-
locate income from the home country. However, since our
data set contains information on parent firms from only one
home country, it is not possible to gauge the impact of this
tax incentive empirically. Thus, we focus on multinationals
that invest in nonhaven countries as well.
To evaluate the incentive to invest in a tax haven, consider
first the situation of a multinational with a tax haven affiliate.
The firm chooses in which other countries to locate affiliates
and how much of their profits to reallocate to the tax haven.
Thus, the investor’s maximization problem, given that it has
a tax haven affiliate, is
max
di ,ψi
n∑
i=1
di
[
ψi + (1 − τi)
(
ρi −ψi − a2
ψi
2
ρi
)
− ci
]
,
(2)
with di ∈ {0, 1}, s.t.
ρi −ψi − a2
ψi
2
ρi
≥ 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , n. (3)
The following lemma describes the solution to this maxi-
mization problem. For ease of presentation, we restrict con-
sideration to parameter cases such that an interior solution
is obtained.4
Lemma 1. Suppose the investor has a tax haven affiliate.
Then the optimal amount of profit shifting is
ψ∗thi =
τiρi
a(1 − τi) . (4)
2 This and other extensions to the model, along with tables reporting sup-
plementary regressions, are presented in supplementary material available
at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/REST_a_00591.
3 For details on the taxation of foreign profits of German multinationals
and the antideferral regulations, refer to the online supplementary material.
4 This is the case if τi ≤ 1 −
√
1
2a+1 , which is trivially fulfilled for a
sufficiently large.
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Let countries be numbered such that country i = 1 yields
the highest after-tax profit, including the fixed cost of setting
up the affiliate, and country i = n yields the lowest profit.
Then the multinational chooses di = 1 for all countries i =
1, . . . , n˜, where n˜ is determined by the condition
ψn˜ + (1 − τn˜)
(
ρn˜ −ψn˜ − a2
ψ2n˜
ρn˜
)
− cn˜ ≥ 0 >
ψn˜+1 + (1 − τn˜+1)
(
ρn˜+1 −ψn˜+1 − a2
ψ2n˜+1
ρn˜+1
)
− cn˜+1.
(5)
Proof. See the online supplementary material.
Consider now the multinational’s situation if it has no
tax haven affiliate. In this case, profit shifting has to be
directed to the country charging the lowest tax rate among
those in which the multinational holds an affiliate.5 Let τ
denote the minimum of all tax rates charged in countries in
which the multinational invests. In the supplementary mate-
rial, we derive the optimal amount of profit shifting ψ∗nthi
and describe the optimal number of countries nˆ in which to
set up a foreign affiliate. It is straightforward to show that
n˜ ≥ nˆ, since the profits realized from each country are poten-
tially larger if it is possible to reduce taxes by reallocating
income to a tax haven.
To determine the incentive to set up a tax haven invest-
ment, let
Πthi = ψ∗thi + (1 − τi)
[
ρi −ψ∗thi −
a
2
ψ∗thi
2
ρi
]
− ci (6)
denote the maximal after-tax profit generated in nonhaven
country i when the company invests in a tax haven, and
similarly, let
Πnthi = (1 − τ)ψ∗nthi
+ (1 − τi)
[
ρi −ψ∗nthi −
a
2
ψ∗nthi
2
ρi
]
− ci (7)
denote the maximal after-tax profit generated in a nonhaven
country i when the company does not invest in a tax haven
but can shift income to a nonhaven country with tax rate τ.
Let Incth denote the net benefit (“Incentive”) from investing
in a tax haven at a setup cost of c0. Then investing in a tax
haven is optimal if and only if
Incth ≡
nˆ∑
i=1
[Πthi −Πnthi ] +
n˜∑
i=nˆ+1
Πthi − c0 > 0. (8)
The main focus of our paper is to determine the impact
of tax rates on the incentive to set up a tax haven. Propo-
sition 1 describes how a change in tax rates in countries in
5 We assume for simplicity that the multinational shifts profits to one
country only. Giving up this assumption would yield computation far more
complicated but would not affect our results qualitatively.
which the multinational is active independent of a tax haven
investment, that is, i = 1, . . . , nˆ, affects the incentive to set
up a tax haven.
Proposition 1. The larger the tax rate in countries in which
the multinational is active independent of a tax haven invest-
ment, the larger is the incentive to establish a tax haven
affiliate:
dIncth
dτi
= d(Π
th
i −Πnthi )
dτi
= (ψ∗thi −ψ∗nthi )
+
[
a
2
ψ∗thi
2
ρi
− a
2
ψ∗nthi
2
ρi
]
> 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , nˆ.
(9)
Proof. See the online supplementary material.
Intuitively, when a company has a tax haven affiliate,
it avoids profits in nonhaven countries more than when it
does not. Thus, the larger are the tax rates in the nonhaven
countries, the larger is the multinational’s incentive to avoid
taxes. This is the main prediction of the model tested in
section VI.
For the interpretation of our empirical results, it is instruc-
tive to evaluate also the effect of tax changes in countries in
which the multinational is active only in case of a tax haven
investment (see the supplementary material for a derivation):
dIncth
dτi
= dΠ
th
i
dτi
= −
[
ρi −ψ∗thi −
a
2
ψ∗thi
2
ρi
]
< 0
∀i = nˆ + 1, . . . , n˜. (10)
This result has the notable implication that a multinational
may in fact be tempted to invest in a tax haven following a
tax reduction in a country in which it has not been present
so far. This prima facie counterintuitive situation can arise
if this tax reduction makes an investment in this country
attractive and hence adds to the potential base for profit shift-
ing. It remains the case that, conditional on foreign pretax
income, higher foreign tax rates increase a firm’s demand
for tax haven operations, but foreign tax changes influence
the production of pretax income in a way that can produce
an unconditional association of higher foreign tax rates with
reduced tax haven demand.
III. Taking Theory to the Data
In this section we discuss some conceptual issues to be
considered in order to test the prediction laid out in propo-
sition 1 and interpret the empirical results in sections VI
and VII. First, the multinational can be engaged in several
countries, and hence the tax rates of all these countries mat-
ter, but potentially to a different extent. Thus, individual
tax rates have to be weighted. Second, we are not able to
observe actual profits, only reported after-tax profits. Third,
the foreign tax rates observed are potentially affected by tax
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haven investments, so the endogeneity needs to be addressed.
Fourth, firms may exhibit heterogeneous costs of profit shift-
ing and hence may differ in their sensitivity to tax rate
changes.
A. Weighting Individual Tax Rate Changes
When attempting to identify the effect of foreign tax rates
on the tax haven decision, we need to take into account that
the multinational is potentially engaged in several countries
and therefore the tax rates of all these countries matter. As
equation (11) shows, they do so to a different extent, how-
ever, depending on the profitability of the individual affiliates
(see the supplementary material):
d2Incth
dτidρi
= τ(2 − τ)
2a(1 − τi)2 > 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , nˆ; (11)
that is, higher profits increase the effect of the foreign tax
rate. We capture this by investigating the impact of the
average nonhaven tax rate, where all the foreign tax rates
are weighted by the profitability of the individual affiliate. If
the multinational has not invested in a tax haven, this average
foreign tax rate is determined by the tax rates in countries
i = 1, . . . , nˆ and is given by∑nˆ
i=1 τiρi∑nˆ
i=1 ρi
. (12)
B. Unobservability of Actual Profits
In our empirical analysis, we encounter the difficulty that
we are not able to observe the actual profits ρi in country
i, only reported after-tax profits (1 − τi)πi. These reported
profits are distorted due to taxation and income reallocation.
In case of a tax haven investment, they are given by
(1 − τi)πi = (1 − τi)
(
ρi −ψi − a2
ψi
2
ρi
)
= (1 − τi)
[
1 − τi(2 − τi)
2a(1 − τi)2
]
ρi. (13)
Inspection shows that this distortion rises with the country’s
tax rate τi. Thus, we require appropriate proxies to capture
the effect of an affiliate’s profitability on the decision to
invest in a tax haven. We will proxy the affiliate’s profitability
by the number of employees, as discussed in more detail
below.
C. Endogeneity of Observed Tax Rates to
Tax Haven Investments
Furthermore, we need to account for the fact that the aver-
age foreign tax rate we observe is potentially affected by the
very fact of whether the multinational holds a tax haven
affiliate. The tax haven investment may make it profitable to
invest in foreign countries i = nˆ + 1, . . . , n˜, that would not
have been attractive destinations for investments without the
income reallocation opportunities created by the tax haven
investment. Consider a change in tax rates Δi ≥ 0 in coun-
tries i = 1, . . . , n˜ such that the investor chooses to invest
in a tax haven after this change in tax rates but would not
do so before. According to equations (9) and (10), both an
increase in the tax rates at locations i = 1, . . . , nˆ, where the
multinational already holds an affiliate, and a decrease in the
tax rates at locations i = nˆ + 1, . . . , n˜, which become attrac-
tive only after tax haven investment, could render tax haven
investment optimal. The average nonhaven tax rate for the
investor changes from the status quo described in equation
(12) to the new average nonhaven tax rate:∑n˜
i=1(τi +Δi)ρi∑n˜
i=1 ρi
. (14)
Taking the difference between equations (14) and (12) yields
the observed change in the nonhaven average tax rate, which
can be rewritten as
∑nˆ
i=1 Δiρi∑n˜
i=1 ρi
+
∑n˜
i=nˆ+1 ρi
(∑n˜
i=nˆ+1(τiρi+Δiρi)∑n˜
i=nˆ+1 ρi
−
∑nˆ
i=1 τiρi∑nˆ
i=1 ρi
)
∑n˜
i=1 ρi
.
(15)
In our empirical analysis, we are interested in identify-
ing the effect of exogenous changes in tax rates in countries
i = 1, . . . , nˆ, that is, countries in which the multinational
would invest even without a tax haven affiliate. This exoge-
nous change in tax rates is captured by the first term. As
shown in equation (9), investing in a tax haven is positively
influenced by an increase in the tax rates of the countries in
which the multinational already holds affiliates. Thus, when
estimating the impact of foreign tax rates, higher tax rates in
countries in which a multinational firm would invest under
any circumstances should stimulate greater demand for tax
haven affiliates.
The second term captures the change in the observed
nonhaven tax rate that is due to the endogeneity of the multi-
national’s investment decision. Evaluating the numerator of
the second term, we find that the observed change in the
average nonhaven tax rate exceeds the change of interest if
the new affiliates the multinational opens due to the tax haven
investment are located in countries that exhibit on average
higher tax rates than the previous average tax rate, and the
converse.
This has important implications for the interpretation of
the causal effects of tax changes. In particular, OLS results
overestimate the true effects, as captured by the IV estimates,
if the tax rates at the firm’s new locations increase the firm’s
average foreign nonhaven tax rate, and underestimate the
true effects if the tax rates faced at the new locations are
lower than the previous average foreign nonhaven tax rate.
Consequently, there are several reasons that simple corre-
lations of foreign nonhaven tax rates with tax haven affiliate
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ownership might not reflect the direct effect of higher for-
eign tax rates on tax haven demand. The first, as noted in
equation (10), is that lower foreign tax rates may encourage
firms to earn greater taxable foreign income, which directly
increases their demand for tax haven operations. The sec-
ond, as reflected in the second term of equation (15), is that
ownership of a tax haven affiliate changes the pattern of
nonhaven foreign investment, resulting in higher or lower
measured average foreign nonhaven tax rates. A third reason,
not captured by this model, is that firms with investments in
tax havens may generally invest in other low-tax countries in
order to reallocate some of their income to countries with tax
rates not quite as low as those offered by tax havens. These
considerations suggest that OLS estimates of the effect of
nonhaven foreign tax rates on demand for tax haven affiliates
may understate the true effect. The empirical work presented
in section VI accounts for the potential endogeneity of the
observed tax rate using an instrumentation strategy based on
the locations of foreign nonhaven affiliates at the start of the
sample period and restricts attention to changes in observed
tax rates for these locations only.
D. Heterogeneous Cost of Profit Shifting
Our empirical strategy also needs to take into account
that firms may differ with respect to their cost of reallocat-
ing profits between countries. As equation (16) shows, the
more difficult profit shifting is for the multinational, the less
sensitive will be its reaction to foreign tax rate changes (see
the supplementary material):
d2Incth
dτida
= − ρiτ(2 − τ)
2a2(1 − τi)2 < 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , nˆ. (16)
Average foreign tax rates and values of the shifting cost
parameter are likely to differ among firms and may vary
systematically among industries. Industries may differ in
average values of the shifting cost parameter a, reflecting
differences in the importance of intangible assets and other
business features that facilitate profit reallocation; industries
may also differ in the extent to which a varies among firms
in the industry. Differentiating equation (16) with respect to
a indicates that
d3Incth
dτid2a
= ρiτ(2 − τ)
a3(1 − τi)2 > 0. (17)
Since the expression in equation (17) is positive, it follows
that the effect of a on dIncdτi is nonlinear and, more specif-
ically, that a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of
a produces a greater average value of dIncdτi . Consequently,
industries in which firms have very different costs of profit
reallocation should be expected to display greater average
sensitivity of tax haven demand to nonhaven tax rates than
do other industries, although average costs of profit reallo-
cation do not differ. We use firm-fixed effects in the baseline
econometric analysis to control for differences in marginal
costs of income reallocation and distinguish firms by indus-
trial sectors to proxy for cost differences that vary with
industry.
IV. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our analysis is based on the Microdatabase Direct invest-
ment (MiDi) provided by the Bundesbank, the German
central bank. We use the information on outward foreign
direct investment by German companies. The database con-
sists of a panel of yearly information on the foreign affiliates
of German firms for the period from 1996 until 2008. By the
German Foreign Trade and Payment Regulation (Aussen-
wirtschaftsverordnung), any resident who holds shares or
voting rights of at least 10% in a company with a balance
sheet total of more than 3 million euros is obliged to report
information on the financial characteristics of these affiliates
to the Bundesbank (Lipponer, 2009).6 The same information
has to be provided on branches or permanent establishments
abroad if their operating assets exceed 3 million euro. The
comprehensiveness of these data suggests that they can be
used to draw a very reliable picture of the foreign investment
of German companies.
The MiDi information on parent companies starts in 2002,
so the analysis is restricted to 2002 to 2008 in order to avoid
the effects of the crash of 2008 and its aftermath.7 During
the 2002–2008 period, the MiDi contains 173,312 affiliate-
year observations. Some affiliates are reported several times,
because multiple investors hold participating interests in
them. We focus our analysis on directly held foreign affiliates
and thus abstract from more complex incentive structures
that may exist in multilevel holding chains.8 This limits the
analysis to 117,585 affiliate-year observations.
For consistency across parents, we delete 218 observations
for which the degree of participation of the parent is smaller
than the reporting requirement of 10%. In addition, we drop
observations on parents in a number of sectors, including
government institutions and private households. We drop
observations on parents in the financial sector, because they
are subject to special balancing requirements. We delete the
sectors housing enterprises and other real estate activities,
as they report neither sales nor employees, which we will
use as the size measure in our analysis. Similarly, we drop
the sector holding companies as reported sales and employ-
ees are very often zero, even though these companies are
6 The reporting thresholds have changed several times in the past. We refer
only to the reporting threshold as of 2002 that is relevant to us.
7 Prior to 2002 Germany taxed corporations using a split-rate system that
imposed a lower rate of tax on profits distributed to shareholders as divi-
dends and taxed dividends using an imputation system that granted credits
to shareholders for taxes paid by corporations on their domestic (but not
foreign) profits. This dividend imputation system may have reduced incen-
tives to reallocate taxable income from Germany to foreign tax havens but
was abolished in 2001.
8 For an in-depth discussion of the complex determinants of ownership
chains, see Weichenrieder and Mintz (2010).
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Table 1.—Choice of Tax Havens, by Sectoral Group
Parent Sector Manufacturing Service Financial
Total number of parent years 11,603 6,733 2,506
Of which with tax haven affiliate 1,976 1,337 932
Of which
internationally active parents 77.23% 59.01% 57.19%
with more than one tax haven affiliate 22.87% 17.50%
Tax Tax Tax
Nonhaven Haven Nonhaven Haven Nonhaven Haven
Number of affiliate years 33,203 2,829 14,427 1,768 7,897 2,294
Of which
In manufacturing sector 51.19% 32.63% 12.08% 4.81% 3.89% 0.74%
In service sector 46.69% 63.56% 82.20% 90.16% 15.35% 18.09%
In financial sector 1.38% 3.39% 4.76% 4.58% 79.84% 81.17%
Other 0.75% 0.42% 0.96% 0.45% 0.92% –
Mean number of affiliates per parent 2.98 1.43 2.33 1.32 3.75 2.46
Choice of Haven Manufacturing Service Financial
Affiliate Parent Affiliate Parent Affiliate Parent
Years Years Years Years Years Years
Big havens (more than 1 million inhabitants)
Hong Kong 459 410 233 219 164 104
Ireland 226 215 78 61 252 188
Lebanon 12 12 8 8
Liberia 16 16
Panama 19 19 20 20 3 3
Singapore 517 467 204 185 203 127
Switzerland 1,368 1,242 880 814 359 312
Small havens (fewer than 1 million inhabitants)
Bermuda 13 13 23 19
British Virgin Islands 21 17 11 11 22 20
Cayman Islands 3 3 233 127
Cyprus 22 22 60 17 8 8
Channel Islands 19 19 89 28
Luxembourg 124 114 163 151 864 587
Malta 38 38 39 30 16 10
Other 23 21 29 27 50 32
Total 2,829 2,579 1,768 1,588 2,294 1,629
Empty cells denote tax havens where fewer than three affiliate-years or parent-years are observed, so the exact number of investments must not be reported for confidentiality reasons. Manufacturing firms: firms
classified NACE 1500–3700; service firms: firms classified NACE 5000–9300, with the sample restrictions already noted; financial firms: firms classified NACE 6500–7000. If a parent invests in several tax havens, it
is counted multiple times (once per tax haven).
not small.9 We later remove this restriction as a robustness
check and find that our results are unaffected.
We finally obtain a sample of 54,367 affiliate-year obser-
vations that correspond to 19,165 parent-year observations.
The observations are distributed evenly across years, with a
minimum of 2,639 observations and a maximum of 2,875
observations.
We augment the MiDi with information on statutory tax
rates mainly from the International Bureau of Fiscal Doc-
umentation (2002–2006, 2007–2009) and information on
GDP from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We use
the definition of tax havens derived by Hines and Rice
(1994), which is widely accepted in the literature and was
only recently used by Dharmapala and Hines (2009).10 Alter-
natively, we could have used the definition propagated by
9 We also delete 331 affiliate-year observations for parents that are not
classified holdings, but are de facto holdings after consultations with the
staff of the Bundesbank.
10 Switzerland is included among the tax havens on this list and is com-
monly considered one of the world’s most important tax havens from the
standpoint of corporate tax planning. Of the six examples of sophisticated
international tax avoidance by U.S. firms analyzed in detail by the Joint
Committee on Taxation (2010), three rely on the use of Swiss affiliates.
the OECD (2000). We chose Hines and Rice’s (1994) tax
haven definition to derive results that are comparable to the
literature, in particular the study by Desai, Foley, and Hines
(2006). Further, no OECD member countries appear on the
OECD’s tax haven list, which thereby omits a number of tax
havens popular with German firms, such as Switzerland.
Table 1 presents descriptive evidence on the use of
tax havens by sectoral group. For comparative purposes,
information on financial firms is provided in addition to
information on firms in the manufacturing and service sector,
which we analyze in later sections.
On average, a tax haven affiliate is held in 20.4% of parent-
years (17.9% excluding financial companies). This figure
seems low by international standards: Desai et al. (2006)
report that tax haven investment is observed for 59% of U.S.
multinational parent companies in 1999.11 This difference
We are unable to distinguish investment in Monaco and Saint Martin from
investment in France, so these tax havens are neglected in our analysis.
11 Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) use the same data as Desai et al. (2006)
and report that U.S. parents own between 7.5 and 7.8 affiliates on average
in the years 1982, 1989, and 1994. Parents in our sample average only 2.8
foreign affiliates (4.0 if indirectly held affiliates are included).
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reflects, in part, the inclusiveness of the MiDi data, in that
the size thresholds for reporting are much lower than in the
U.S. data analyzed by Desai et al. (2006), resulting in a
higher proportion of small firms and those with relatively
small foreign operations.
The proportion of firms owning tax haven affiliates is
higher for service firms (19.9%) than for manufacturing
firms (17.0%), and a larger proportion of service firms own
a tax haven affiliate but are not internationally active in non-
haven countries. About a fifth of both manufacturing and
service firms that are present in tax havens own more than
one tax haven affiliate, and the mean number of tax haven
affiliates is also approximately equal. In contrast, 37.2%
of financial firms hold affiliates in tax havens, and they
own on average twice as many tax haven affiliates as do
manufacturing and service firms.
The share of affiliates in tax havens that are in the service
sector is disproportionately high. For manufacturing firms,
the share of service affiliates in tax havens is about 17 per-
centage points higher than their overall share of affiliates in
the service sector, and for service firms, it is 8 percentage
points higher. Also for financial companies, investment in
service affiliates is more common in tax havens than in
nonhaven countries.
The lower panel of table 1 reports the number of affiliate-
year and parent-year observations by tax haven and sectoral
group of the parent firm. It shows that the preferred tax
haven destination varies by sectoral group. Manufacturing
firms clearly prefer the big tax havens. More than 90% of
observations are accumulated there—about 48% in Switzer-
land alone. The island tax havens, in particular Bermuda,
the Cayman Islands, and the Channel Islands, are very rare
investment destinations. Switzerland is similarly popular
among service firms; about half of their tax haven affili-
ates are located there. Service firms more extensively use
the small havens, where almost a fifth of tax haven affili-
ates are located, most prominently 9% in Luxembourg. For
financial companies, Luxembourg is distinctly the most pop-
ular destination, with 38% of affiliate-year observations in
tax havens. The Cayman Islands are their fourth most impor-
tant tax haven destination: 10% of affiliate-year observations
in tax havens are located there. Evidently the attractiveness
of tax havens strongly depends on sector characteristics.
Figures 1 and 2 provide local polynomial plots of the
relationship of tax haven investment and foreign nonhaven
taxation for manufacturing and service firms with at least two
foreign affiliates in the pooled sample. The x-axis shows the
average of the statutory tax rates faced by a parent firm’s
foreign affiliates in nonhaven countries weighted by num-
ber of employees, which is the measure of foreign nonhaven
taxation used in the empirical analysis.12 Foreign tax rates
are weighted by number of employees to reflect sizes of for-
eign operations, and therefore potential production of taxable
12 The number of employees is adjusted by the participation of the parent
in the affiliate.
Figure 1.—Manufacturing Firms
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Average foreign non-haven tax rate
This figure displays the graph resulting from a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of the
relationship of tax haven use and the average foreign nonhaven tax rate by firms with at least two foreign
affiliates for manufacturing firms. The average foreign nonhaven tax rate is measured in percent, and tax
haven use is displayed as a fraction of firms; the shaded region is the 95% confidence interval. Observations
in the lowest and highest percentile of the average foreign nonhaven tax rate are excluded.
Figure 2.—Service Firms
.1
.2
.3
.4
Ta
x 
ha
ve
n 
us
e
15 20 25 30 35
Average foreign non-haven tax rate
This figure displays the graph resulting from a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of the
relationship of tax haven use and the average foreign nonhaven tax rate by firms with at least two foreign
affiliates for service firms. The average foreign nonhaven tax rate is measured in percent; tax haven use is
displayed as fraction of firms; the shaded region is the 95% confidence interval. Observations in the lowest
and highest percentile of the average foreign nonhaven tax rate are excluded.
income subject to different tax rates; weighting foreign tax
rates by assets or sales produces similar results, though with
smaller samples due to data limitations. The variable on the
y-axis is tax haven use, a binary variable that is equal to 1
whenever a parent invested in at least one tax haven in a
given year. For both service firms and manufacturing firms,
the cross-sectional relationship of taxation and tax haven
use increases over a wide range of tax rates. The increase for
manufacturing firms is steeper than for service firms, though
both largely level off at average foreign tax rates above 25%
to 28%.13
13 We explored an empirical specification including a quadratic term of
the foreign nonhaven tax rate, but a quadratic relationship is not robustly
supported by the data.
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Table 2.—Summary Statistics, Regression Sample
Full Sample Manufacturing Firms Service Firms
Mean Mean Mean
Mean SD Difference Mean SD Difference Mean SD Difference
Have haven .151 .359 – .152 .359 – .147 .355 –
[within variation] .138 – .135 – .135 –
Number of parent employees (in 1,000) 1.425 8.167 4.175∗∗∗ 1.413 7.189 4.188∗∗∗ 1.495 10.419 4.401∗∗∗
Ln (number of parent employees) 5.604 1.783 1.234∗∗∗ 6.011 1.380 1.108∗∗∗ 4.666 2.201 1.415∗∗∗
Number of nonhaven employees (in 1,000) .519 2.573 1.540∗∗∗ .584 2.959 1.887∗∗∗ .382 1.517 .776∗∗∗
Ln (number of nonhaven employees) 4.609 1.710 1.337∗∗∗ 4.784 1.642 1.454∗∗∗ 4.216 1.786 1.080∗∗∗
Average foreign nonhaven tax rate .299 .056 0.005∗∗∗ .303 0.053 0.003∗∗ .296 0.057 0.008∗∗∗
Average tax rate at 2001 nonhaven locations .315 .058 0.017∗∗∗ .320 0.055 0.015∗∗∗ .307 0.060 0.017∗∗∗
Average market size 6.715 1.327 −0.082∗∗ 6.858 1.331 −0.177∗∗∗ 6.509 1.276 0.069
Average distance 7.176 0.998 0.223∗∗∗ 7.296 1.002 0.223∗∗∗ 6.932 0.959 0.237∗∗∗
Average regulatory quality 1.134 0.486 −0.032∗∗ 1.112 0.479 −0.025∗∗ 1.206 0.483 −0.066∗∗∗
Average rule of law 1.051 0.599 −0.005 1.022 0.580 0.002 1.143 0.627 −0.048∗
Average control of corruption 1.059 0.728 0.037∗∗ 1.023 0.703 0.051∗ 1.178 0.767 −0.038
Observations 12,755 8,533 3,751
Full sample includes parent firms in the sectors agriculture, mining, electricity and water supply, and construction, in addition to manufacturing and service firms. Mean difference by haven status; base category:
does not hold an affiliate in tax haven. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Manufacturing firms: firms classified NACE 1500–3700; service firms: firms classified NACE 5000–9300, with the already noted sample restrictions. Have haven: indicator variable; 1 if parent firm owns at least one
affiliate in at least one tax haven in a given year, 0 otherwise. Number of parent employees: number of employees, parent firm. Number of nonhaven employees: sum of number of employees in affiliates not located
in tax havens, reduced according to share of participating interests. Average foreign nonhaven tax rate: Average of the statutory tax rates faced by foreign affiliates in nonhaven locations weighted by affiliate number
of employees, adjusted by share of participation where appropriate. Average tax rate at 2001 nonhaven locations: Average of the statutory tax rates faced by foreign affiliates in nonhaven locations of 2001 weighted
by GDP. Average market size: mean GDP of foreign nonhaven countries where firms invest. Average distance: mean distance of these foreign nonhaven countries (source: CEPII). Average regulatory quality, rule of
law, control of corruption: mean scores of these foreign nonhaven countries from the World Governance Indicators (WGI) for the indicators regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The numbers of
observations are 12,731, 8,518, and 3,742 for the WGI indicators because data are not available for Taiwan.
The top part of table 2 provides an overview of the main
variables used in our regression analysis for the full sample
and the two subgroups we consider. We explain the variables
in detail in the next section. The proportion of firms invest-
ing in a tax haven is lower (around 15%) than for the full
data and equal across sectoral groups, because firms invest-
ing only in a tax haven drop from the regression sample.
As firms with 0 sales or employees drop, the average size
of the firms used in our regressions is slightly higher than
the average size of all firms in the sample. The statistics of
the average foreign nonhaven tax rate and the instruments
for the regression sample are similar.14 The third columns
for every group report mean difference tests of the main
regressors by the dependent variable. Firms that invest in a
tax haven are on average significantly larger, both domesti-
cally and internationally. In addition, they face significantly
higher average foreign tax rates, which is consistent with the
incentives discussed earlier.
The bottom part of table 2 compares the characteristics
of foreign nonhaven investment destinations of firms with
and without tax haven affiliates. Firms with tax haven affili-
ates appear to invest in countries that are smaller on average,
though there is no significant difference in market size for
service firms. They invest in countries that are more dis-
tant from Germany. Concerning the institutional quality as
measured by the World Governance Indicators (WGI), their
investment destinations exhibit a significantly lower regu-
latory quality and, for service firms, a significantly lower
14 We drop 4.1% of manufacturing firms and 8.6% of service firms because
only investment in tax havens is observed. We drop 4.0% of the remaining
manufacturing firms and 18.0% of service firms due to their 0 number of
employees. Table C.1 in the supplementary material presents the summary
statistics for the full data.
perception of the rule of law. The control of corruption
seems to be slightly better in destination countries of firms
that invest in tax havens, at least for the full sample and
manufacturing firms.
V. Empirical Approach
As outlined in section II, a multinational firm’s decision
to invest in a tax haven depends on the taxation it faces at its
foreign nonhaven locations, its marginal cost of reallocating
taxable income, and the fixed cost of tax haven investment.
Conditional on pretax foreign income, the probability of tax
haven investment should increase as foreign nonhaven tax
rates rise, with this effect being strongest for firms with low
costs of reallocating profits.
We specify the following linear probability model:
yjt = β0 + β1τjt + β2pjt + β3p2jt + β4nhjt + β5nh2jt
+ αj + γt + ujt . (18)
The dependent variable yjt is a dummy that is equal to 1
if a firm j holds at least one affiliate in at least one tax haven
in a year t. Our independent variables are τjt , the average
of the statutory tax rates faced by j’s nonhaven affiliates
in t weighted by the number of affiliate employees; pjt , the
natural log of the size of company j in period t and its square,
p2jt; nhjt , the natural log of the size of j’s foreign nonhaven
activities in t and its square, nh2jt; αi, the firm-specific costs
of reallocating profits across countries; and γt , a year fixed
effect.
The coefficient of main interest is β1. As indicated above,
we expect β1 > 0. It captures the effect of the taxes levied on
the profits of a multinational’s foreign nonhaven affiliates on
the probability that it invests in a tax haven. Equation (11)
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implies that greater firm profitability increases the impact
of nonhaven tax rates on the likelihood of investing in a
tax haven affiliate. Thus, we use a weighted, not a simple,
average of the foreign nonhaven tax rates. For this purpose,
we use the number of employees of the affiliate, adjusted by
the degree of participation of the parent, to approximate the
relative importance of an affiliate for a multinational group.
We also explore alternative weights and find that our results
are largely unaffected (see supplementary table C.5).
There are two potentially important challenges in estimat-
ing equation (18): the endogeneity of the observed foreign
nonhaven tax rates and unobserved firm heterogeneity in
the cost of investing in a tax haven. The variable cost of
advantageously using a tax haven affiliate should vary with
firm-specific characteristics such as the extent to which a firm
holds and uses intangible assets such as intellectual property.
The location of intangible assets, license arrangements, and
royalty payments have been shown to be used as income
reallocation tools (e.g., Dischinger & Riedel, 2011; Karkin-
sky & Riedel, 2012).15 A firm with larger intangible assets
should have greater discretion in choosing transfer prices due
to the lack of comparable market transactions. Thus, and as
suggested by equation (16), the response to changes in for-
eign taxation should vary across firms depending on their
marginal cost of income reallocation. These firm-specific
characteristics are, however, unobservable.
We take two measures to address this issue. First, we
conduct our analysis separately for the group of manufactur-
ing firms (NACE 1500–3700) and for the group of service
firms (NACE 5000–9300, with the already noted restric-
tions),16 out of concern that manufacturing firms may rely to
a significantly greater degree on intangible property. Further-
more, manufacturing and service firms may have differing
tax and nontax determinants of foreign location and may dif-
fer in the extent to which foreign locations can substitute for
each other. One observable indicator of differences between
manufacturing and service firms is that manufacturing firms
are more R&D intensive. Using sector-level data from the
Innovation Survey of the Center for European Economic
Research (Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung,
ZEW) for the years 1996 to 2008, we find that the average
R&D intensity for the manufacturing sector is twice as high
as the R&D intensity for service sectors. At the same time,
the descriptive evidence provided in section IV shows that
the proportion of service firms owning tax haven affiliates
and the share of service firms’ affiliate years observed in
tax havens are higher than the corresponding statistics for
manufacturing firms. Firms in service industries have oper-
ations in tax havens in part to provide business services to
other firms located there; consequently, some of the attrac-
tion may stem not from their own tax avoidance but from
15 In addition, a variant of this type of strategy is part of all six case studies
of the report by the Joint Committee on Taxation (2010) prepared for the
public hearing before the House Committee on Ways and Means.
16 This implies that we do not consider parent firms in agriculture, mining,
electricity and water supply, and construction in our analysis.
that of others. Furthermore, there may be lower fixed costs
of tax haven investment for service firms, so not only taxa-
tion but also parent size could have a differential impact on
tax haven investment by manufacturing and service firms. In
addition, the share of service affiliates of manufacturing par-
ents located in tax havens is disproportionately higher than
the share located in nonhaven countries. Overall, there is
thus reason to believe that the processes governing tax haven
investment by service firms and by manufacturing firms
may differ significantly, which suggests that they should be
analyzed separately. We report the results of a full-sample
analysis in the supplementary material in table C.2.
The second way in which the analysis addresses unob-
served firm heterogeneity is through the use of firm fixed
effects to capture the influence of firm-specific differences in
the marginal cost of income reallocation, at least to the extent
that they are approximately constant over the sample period.
Fixed effects also account for unobserved firm-specific char-
acteristics such as the degree of tax sensitivity, that is, the
importance that a firm assigns to the amount of its tax pay-
ments, which may render firms ex ante more or less likely to
invest in tax havens.17 Likewise, the data provide information
on the sector of the affiliates mostly at the two-digit NACE
Rev. 1 level, so particular incentive schemes for firms in
subsectors cannot be taken into account, and we do not have
information on the subnational location of firms, so we can-
not account for local taxation. The use of firm-fixed effects
controls for time-invariant aspects of these firm attributes.
In estimating equation (18), it is necessary to take into
account that the average foreign nonhaven tax rate is endoge-
nous because entry in a tax haven may have a feedback effect
on the optimal location decisions of a firm, as discussed in
section III. To address this issue, we use an instrumenta-
tion strategy based on the initial location decisions of the
firm. We fix the location decisions of the firm in the year
2001, the year prior to our analysis period, and instrument
the observed average foreign nonhaven tax rate with a hypo-
thetical average foreign nonhaven tax rate had the firm not
changed the locations of its foreign affiliates. The instrument
thus captures only changes in firms’ foreign nonhaven taxa-
tion that result from changes in tax rates, not from changes
in location decisions.18 To counter any endogeneity that may
be left on the intensive margin, we use GDP instead of
the number of employees as weights when calculating our
instrument.19 Our instrumentation strategy thus eliminates
the endogeneity in the observed average foreign nonhaven
tax rate by leveraging the insights drawn from our theoretical
analysis: with the endogeneity stemming from firms adjust-
ing their nonhaven investment due to tax haven investment,
17 This issue has been raised but not addressed in Desai et al. (2006).
18 Sixty-nine of the 101 countries in the 2002 sample changed their tax
rates over the 2002–2008 period. In most cases, these changes were reduc-
tions, though there is sufficient cross-sectional variation (including some
tax rate increases) to identify tax rate effects.
19 Earlier studies indicate that GDP correlates very closely with foreign
investment and foreign profitability in both an aggregate cross section (e.g.,
Hines & Rice, 1994) and a firm-level panel (e.g., Desai et al., 2006).
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our instrument abstracts from any changes in the average
foreign nonhaven tax rate that may be induced due to firms
investing or ceasing to invest in a tax haven after 2001. This
instrumenting strategy requires that the distribution of for-
eign investment in 2001 be unrelated to subsequent changes
in demand for tax haven affiliates except through the effect
of changing statutory tax rates, which is entirely plausible
given the unpredictability of tax changes. Tax rates gener-
ally declined over this period, though there was significant
variation among countries. In an earlier version of this paper,
results using an instrumentation strategy similar to Desai et
al. (2006) are derived (Gumpert, Hines, & Schnitzer, 2011).
Other considerations in estimating equation (18) include
that, in principle, the probability of tax haven investment
is also influenced by taxation in the multinational’s home
country. As we use a panel data set of German multinational
firms, this effect cannot be gauged explicitly due to lack of
sufficient variation. Still, changes in home country taxation
are indirectly taken into account through the year fixed effect.
Other independent variables include parent size and the
size of the parent’s nonhaven activities, capturing the impact
of size on profitability. Recent literature on foreign direct
investment suggests that larger firms with bigger interna-
tional activities can be expected to be more productive than
their smaller competitors (Helpman, Melitz, & Yeaple, 2004;
Tomiura, 2007; Yeaple, 2009; Chen & Moore, 2010). Con-
sequently, these firms are better able to overcome the fixed
and variable costs associated with setting up an affiliate in a
tax haven and its subsequent use for income reallocation.
We use numbers of employees to measure parent size
and the size of the company’s foreign nonhaven activities,
reduced according to the share of participation interests
where applicable. Because the distribution of the size vari-
ables is strongly skewed to the right, the regressions use the
natural log of employees as a size measure. Thus, obser-
vations for which the size variables are 0 drop from our
regression sample. Following Desai et al. (2006), regressions
include the size measures both linearly and squared.
In sum, we estimate our regression equation in four
ways:
• Pooled linear probability model
• pooled linear instrumental variables model
• Linear fixed-effects model
• Linear fixed-effects model with instrumental variables
The linear fixed-effects model with instrumental variables
is our preferred specification because it takes all sources
of endogeneity into account, though when using it, the tax
coefficients are identified only by firms that change their
ownership of tax havens, which only 6.92% of the sample
does. It is therefore valuable to consider the results of all
four specifications, because they offer evidence of the factors
that drive a firm’s decision to invest in a tax haven beyond
that available from only the fixed-effects IV regression. By
comparing estimates of pooled and instrumental variables, it
is possible to assess the bias due to endogeneity of the for-
eign location decisions. Juxtaposing the results of pooled and
fixed-effects specifications facilitates a balanced assessment
of the influence of taxation, abstracting from unobservable
differences in costs of using tax haven operations.
We use a linear probability model because otherwise it
would be difficult to address the endogeneity issues satisfac-
torily in a limited dependent-variables framework.20 Using
logit or probit would yield more accurate marginal effects at
different points of the distribution of the covariates, though
it is reassuring that at most 7% of the predicted first-stage
probabilities of investing in tax havens in the regressions
reported in table 3 lie outside the [0,1] interval. In the logit
framework, using firm fixed-effects would be possible, but it
is more problematic to use instruments.21 In the probit frame-
work, we could conduct an instrumental variables analysis
(though under very strong distributional assumptions) but
would not be able to use firm fixed effects.
We generally use standard errors clustered at the level
of the parent. For the fixed-effects instrumental variables
regression, we use bootstrapped standard errors, as clustered
standard errors cannot be estimated. As Efron and Tibshirani
(1998) recommended, the bootstrap estimates are based on
200 replications.
VI. Results
Table 3 presents the regression results. The first four
columns in the table present results for the sample of man-
ufacturing firms, and columns 5 to 8 present results for the
sample of service firms. The odd-numbered columns present
the results if no instrument is used, and the even-numbered
columns contain the IV estimates.22 The F-test for exclusion
of the instrument in the first-stage regression is rejected at
high significance levels in all cases. The absolute value of the
F-statistic is higher than the threshold of 10 recommended
by Staiger and Stock (1997) to obtain unbiased estimates
and higher than the thresholds proposed by Stock and Yogo
(2002) to assume standard errors are unbiased.
The average foreign nonhaven tax rate is estimated to
have a significantly positive effect on the probability of a
manufacturing firm’s investing in a tax haven throughout
regressions. The coefficient in the 2SLS regressions is about
twice as high, and significantly so, as the coefficient in the
20 The results were replicated using logit, probit, fixed-effects logit, and
IV probit, all of which are presented in supplementary tables C.8 and C.9.
This omits a limited dependent-variable model with fixed effects and
instrumental variables, which would be unidentified.
21 Purely practically, one could construct an IV variant of fixed-effects
logit by plugging in the predicted values from an OLS first-stage regression
in place of the endogenous variable and run a fixed-effects logit second-stage
regression. We refrain from doing so because this approach may not pro-
duce consistent estimates, as conditional expectations do not pass through
nonlinear functions (see Wooldridge, 2002, and Angrist & Pischke, 2009).
22 Regression results for the full sample and first-stage equations for the IV
estimates, are reported in the supplementary material in tables C.2 and C.3.
The effect of the tax rate is estimated to be significantly positive in both the
OLS and 2SLS specification and insignificant if fixed effects are included.
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Table 3.—Regression Results
Manufacturing Service
OLS 2SLS FE FEIV OLS 2SLS FE FEIV
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Average foreign 0.615∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗ 0.347∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗ −0.064 0.171
nonhaven tax rate (0.122) (0.156) (0.113) (0.184) (0.203) (0.211) (0.149) (0.206)
Parent size −0.061∗∗ −0.058∗∗ −0.014 −0.014 0.016 0.016 −0.010 −0.010
(0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.027) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.014)
Parent size, squared 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Foreign nonhaven −0.051∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗ −0.068∗∗ −0.065∗∗ −0.052∗∗ −0.051∗∗
size (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.030) (0.030) (0.023) (0.026)
Foreign nonhaven 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
size, squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.004 −0.117 0.026 0.007 −0.074 −0.176∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.118
(0.078) (0.086) (0.083) (0.087) (0.090) (0.093) (0.069) (0.077)
Number of observations 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 3,751 3,751 3,751 3,751
Number of parents 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696 832 832 832 832
R2 overall 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.09
R2 within – – 0.02 0.02 – – 0.02 0.03
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
F-statistics – 4,064.39∗∗∗ – 465.73∗∗∗ – 1,872.06∗∗∗ – 717.80∗∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the parent firm or bootstrapped with 200 replications. Regression sample: columns 1–4 manufacturing
firms (i.e., firms classified NACE 1500–3700); columns 5–8, service firms (i.e., firms classified NACE 500–9300, except NACE 65xx, 70xx, 7490, 75xx). Dependent variable: dummy variable that denotes whether a
parent owns at least one affiliate in at least one tax haven in a given year. Independent variables: see table 2.
pooled OLS regression, which does not take the endogeneity
of the average foreign nonhaven tax rate into account. Like-
wise, the coefficient in the fixed-effects IV specification is
slightly higher than in the simple fixed-effects regressions,
though the difference is not significant. This suggests that
the true effect of the average foreign nonhaven tax rate is
underestimated if the endogeneity of the observed tax rate
due to simultaneity is not taken into account.
The estimates suggest that the magnitude of the tax effect
is sizable when interpreted in the context of limited tax haven
use by German firms. The 0.347 coefficient estimate in col-
umn 4 of table 3 implies that increasing a firm’s average
foreign tax rate by 1 percentage point is associated with a
0.347% greater likelihood of holding a tax haven affiliate.23
Since, according to table 2, 15.2% of German manufacturing
firms in the regression sample have tax haven affiliates, the
implied semielasticity of tax haven demand is 0.347/0.152 =
2.3, meaning that a 1 percentage point higher foreign non-
haven tax rate is associated with 2.3% greater demand for
a tax haven affiliate. Greater domestic and foreign activities
are associated with a higher likelihood of tax haven invest-
ment, and the estimated coefficients on the size variables are
largely unaffected by the use of the instruments. The effect of
parent size turns insignificant in specifications that include
fixed effects.
As the regression results in the columns 5 to 8 of table 3
show, the estimated effect of the average foreign nonhaven
tax rate on tax haven investment by service firms varies
with the estimation approach. It is positive and significant
23 This and other estimated tax effects change very little if the average pop-
ulation of countries in which a firm has its nonhaven operations is included
as an explanatory variable.
in the pooled OLS specification; larger and significant when
estimated with 2SLS; and the point estimates of the tax coef-
ficients in the regressions for service firms in columns 5 and
6 are almost identical to the point estimates of the tax coef-
ficients in the corresponding regressions for manufacturing
firms presented in columns 1 and 2. The tax coefficients
in the fixed-effects regressions for service firms reported in
columns 7 and 8 are statistically 0.
The estimates reported in columns 5 to 8 of table 3 sug-
gest that the probability of tax haven investment by service
firms is generally unaffected by the size of parent compa-
nies. This is largely the product of the quadratic functional
form imposed by these regressions (and that appear to fit
well for manufacturing firms); in alternative regressions in
which parent size is entered linearly, its estimated coefficient
is positive and statistically significant in both the OLS and
the IV specifications. Levels of foreign activity outside of
tax havens are estimated to have nonlinear and significant
effects on tax haven operations, similar to the effects found
for manufacturing firms.
Our preferred estimates come from the fixed-effects IV
specification. They show that manufacturing firms are more
likely to invest in tax havens if they face higher tax rates in
their foreign nonhaven locations, even if unobservable dif-
ferences in the cost of income reallocation are taken into
account. It is noteworthy that Desai et al. (2006) report the
opposite pattern for U.S. firms, which are subject to a very
different home-country taxation regime.24 In contrast, we do
24 The regressions reported in table 3 use instruments that differ from
those used by Desai et al. (2006), though Gumpert et al. (2011) find that
running these regressions using the instruments employed by Desai et al.
(2006) produces results that differ little from those reported in table 3.
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not find a clear tax effect for service firms in our preferred
framework. This difference may reflect a combination of
factors: that service firms have higher costs of reallocating
profits or exhibit lower variability in these costs. Manufac-
turing firms may rely to a greater average extent than service
firms do on the returns to intangible property, the location of
which may be more readily reallocated for tax purposes than
are other forms of income, but the distribution of which is
highly skewed, with some manufacturing firms earning sig-
nificant fractions of their profits from intangible property
and others very little. These factors would imply that for-
eign nonhaven tax rates should affect tax haven demand by
manufacturing firms more heavily than service firms, even
though service firms are at least as likely as manufactur-
ing firms to establish tax haven operations in the first place.
The 2SLS estimates appear to pick up the effect of omitted
differences in the costs of income reallocation.
The evidence suggests that service firms face very differ-
ent business opportunities in tax havens than do manufactur-
ing firms, possibly in part due to the presence of other firms
that demand their services and possibly due to lower fixed
costs. The German antideferral provisions imply that a multi-
national not only needs to formally establish a company in a
tax haven (often referred to as “letterbox company”) but has
to locate some productive activity there. Our evidence sug-
gests that this could be more costly on net for manufacturing
than for service firms.
VII. Robustness Checks
A. Sector-Level R&D Intensity as a Proxy for the Marginal
Cost of Profit Shifting
Ownership of valuable intangible assets is widely thought
to lower the cost of reallocating taxable income to low-tax
jurisdictions. Many of a firm’s intangible assets are unob-
servable to outsiders, but the R&D intensity of a firm’s
industry is observable and is likely to be associated with
ownership of intangibles. Empirical specifications with firm
fixed effects and interactions between foreign tax rates and
sectoral R&D intensity therefore have the potential to indi-
cate the extent to which differences in costs of income
reallocation influence the effect of tax rates on demand for
tax haven affiliates.
Sectoral data on R&D intensity are provided by the Center
for European Economic Research (Zentrum für Europäische
Wirtschaftsforschung, ZEW) based on its annual Innova-
tion Survey. We include the industry R&D intensities as
well as an interaction term of industry R&D intensity and
average foreign nonhaven tax rate in the pooled regressions.
We refrain from doing so in the regressions with firm fixed
effects because the firm fixed effects capture firm-level het-
erogeneity with regard to the R&D intensity, so the firm fixed
effects and the sectoral R&D data are collinear.
We cluster the standard errors on industry level and drop
firms assigned to different sectors in different years to avoid
artificial variation.25 Our findings are presented in table 4.
The estimates for manufacturing firms are largely unaf-
fected by the inclusion of the R&D intensity, which has
an insignificantly negative coefficient in the OLS and 2SLS
specifications in columns 1 and 3. The interaction of R&D
intensity and the average foreign nonhaven tax rate is posi-
tive and, in the 2SLS specification, significantly so. Given the
same average foreign nonhaven tax rate, firms in sectors with
higher R&D intensity and thus lower costs of profit realloca-
tion are more likely to invest in tax havens. The base effect
of the sector R&D intensity is negative. This implies that
lower costs of profit reallocation do not increase tax haven
investment per se, only if taxation renders profit reallocation
sufficiently lucrative.
For service firms, neither the base effect nor the interaction
of R&D intensity with the tax rate is significant, and the other
coefficients are largely unaffected by their inclusion. When
service firms and manufacturing firms are analyzed together
in the same sample, the effect of R&D interacted with the for-
eign tax rate is positive and on the borderline of significance
in the IV specification. Taken together, these observations
are evidence in favor of the interpretation that the variance
in profit-shifting cost is higher for manufacturing firms than
for service firms, so the former react more strongly to dif-
ferences in taxation and the marginal costs of profit shifting
(see equation [17]). Service firms’ tax haven investment in
contrast is largely unaffected by (sectoral) differences in the
marginal cost of profit shifting; together with the observation
that the tax coefficient is insignificant in the fixed-effects
specification, this points to opportunities to offer business
services to other firms located in tax havens, possibly in
addition to low fixed costs of tax haven investment.
B. Additional Modifications of the Baseline Specification
Average foreign tax rates used in the regressions reported
in tables 3 and 4 equal statutory tax rates in all of the for-
eign countries in which a firm has affiliates, weighted by
employment levels in each country. Employment is just one
possible weight to use in constructing such average tax rates.
Table C.5 in the supplementary material presents estimated
tax rate coefficients from regressions identical to those pre-
sented in table 3, but for which different weights are used
to construct average foreign tax rates. The estimated tax
coefficients change very little between these specifications.
The coefficient estimates presented in tables 3 and 4 cor-
respond to specifications in which a firm’s contemporaneous
demand for tax haven affiliates is unaffected by whether the
firm has incurred the cost of establishing tax haven affiliates
in prior years. To the extent that they influence outcomes,
the impact of prior actions can be captured by including
a lagged dependent variable in the equation for tax haven
25 We drop 639 manufacturing firms and 322 service firms for this reason.
First-stage equations for the 2SLS specifications separately instrument for
tax rates and tax rate × R&D intensity interactions and are available in
supplemental table C.4.
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Table 4.—Regression Results Including Sector R&D Intensity
Manufacturing Services
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Average foreign non 0.607∗∗∗ 0.435∗ 1.028∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗ 0.451∗ 0.489∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 0.905∗∗∗
haven tax rate (0.127) (0.240) (0.163) (0.279) (0.241) (0.285) (0.244) (0.275)
Parent size −0.058∗∗ −0.057∗∗ −0.056∗∗ −0.053∗∗ 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Parent size, squared 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Foreign nonhaven −0.051∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗
size (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
Foreign nonhaven 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
size, squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R&D intensity 0.000 −0.012 −0.001 −0.033∗ 0.010 0.020 0.008 −0.009
(0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.018) (0.006) (0.033) (0.006) (0.035)
Interaction tax R&D 0.039 0.107∗ −0.033 0.054
intensity (0.055) (0.062) (0.105) (0.116)
Constant −0.011 0.039 −0.140 −0.006 −0.041 −0.053 −0.190∗ −0.169
(0.081) (0.104) (0.089) (0.107) (0.102) (0.114) (0.099) (0.107)
Number of observations 7,962 7,962 7,962 7,962 2,858 2,858 2,858 2,858
Number of sectoral groups 23 23 23 23 14 14 14 14
R2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
F-statistics tax – – 3,121.24∗∗∗ 1,595.31∗∗∗ – – 1,463.28∗∗∗ 1,911.39∗∗∗
F-statistics interaction – – – 3,093.64∗∗∗ – – – 915.84∗∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the level of parent industry. P-values of R&D intensity for service firms in columns 5 to 8 are 11.9%, 15.2%,
22.7%, and 59.5%. Dependent variable: Dummy variable that denotes whether a parent owns at least one affiliate in at least one tax haven in a given year. Independent variables: see table 2. R&D intensity: calculated
as expenditures on innovation over total sales by sector. Interaction tax R&D intensity: interaction of sector R&D intensity and firm-level average foreign nonhaven tax rate.
demand, though this requires appropriate instrumenting and
that the sample be adjusted accordingly. Table C.6 in the
supplementary material presents the results of estimating a
system with lagged dependent variables, including twice-
lagged variables as instruments (as implied by pretests).
Taken together the evidence suggests that demand for tax
haven affiliates by manufacturing firms may be significantly
influenced by prior tax haven activity.
Further, we reestimate our baseline equation using lim-
ited dependent-variable models as far as possible: probit,
logit, IV probit, and fixed-effects logit. The sign pattern
of the coefficients is largely robust. The average marginal
effects of the average foreign nonhaven tax rate are similar
to the marginal effects estimated using the linear probabil-
ity model, except for the fixed-effects logit average marginal
effect being insignificant for manufacturing firms. Thus, the
findings are largely consistent with our previous results (see
tables C.8 and C.9 in the supplementary material).
The supplementary material contains further robustness
checks.
VIII. Conclusion
Tax haven operations can facilitate tax avoidance by
multinational firms, but the evidence suggests that these
opportunities are limited. Roughly 80% of German multi-
national firms do not have affiliates in tax havens, reflecting
that the available tax savings are less than the costs of estab-
lishing the affiliates. Furthermore, even among the firms with
tax haven operations, some undoubtedly choose their loca-
tions for normal business reasons unrelated to tax savings.
Despite the apparently limited appeal of using tax haven
operations to avoid taxes, the evidence is consistent with tax
motivations of some firms, particularly those in manufac-
turing industries. Larger firms, and those with other foreign
operations located in high-tax countries, are more likely than
others to have affiliates in tax havens. Research-intensive
firms that may have greater tax avoidance opportunities than
others are the most likely to have tax haven operations.
The model implies that high foreign tax rates encourage
tax haven investment, but that this effect is dampened by
firm-specific marginal costs of income reallocation. Further,
the model indicates that the relationship between nonhaven
taxation and the incentive to invest in a tax haven is com-
plex and composed of two opposite effects. Higher tax rates
at the locations where a firm is already present before invest-
ing in a tax haven increase the probability of investing in a
tax haven, as expected. In contrast, the opposite relation-
ship holds for tax rates at locations that become attractive
investment venues only for firms that also have tax haven
investments: the attractiveness of tax havens increases as
tax rates fall in these potential investment locations. This
mechanism may in part explain the persistence of tax haven
investment despite falling tax rates elsewhere.
There appear to be significant differences between the
tax haven investment patterns of service and manufactur-
ing firms. High foreign tax rates are associated with tax
haven investments of manufacturing firms, which is con-
sistent with tax havens being used to reallocate taxable
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income from jurisdictions in which it is taxed more heavily.
At the mean, an increase in the average foreign nonhaven
tax rate of 1 percentage point increases by 2.3% the like-
lihood that a manufacturing firm has a tax haven affiliate.
This effect is robust to controlling for unobservable firm-
specific differences. Tax haven investment by service firms
is not significantly influenced by taxation if unobservable
firm-specific characteristics are taken into account. This evi-
dence is consistent with service firms facing high marginal
costs of income reallocation and relatively little variability
in these costs, which together depress the effects of foreign
tax rate differences. Still, tax haven investment is relatively
more common among service firms than among manufactur-
ing firms, reflecting opportunities to sell business services to
other firms operating in tax havens. This suggests that policy
measures that raise the cost of income reallocation may dis-
courage tax haven investment. At the same time, such policy
measures may encourage firms to shift real activities to tax
havens. Given the increasing share of service industries in
Western economies, the tax-avoidance activities of service
firms, and their consequences, offer a fruitful area for further
research.
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